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1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that an analysis of economic 
systems, which includes markets, as being complex could lead to a better 
understanding of the individuals’ actions. In particular, one element that could be 
incorporated in analysis is the heterogeneity of agents and of their rationality. For 
example, the existence of multiple prices on a market for the same good, sold at 
the same moment and at the same place, cannot be captured in an equilibrium 
model, whereas it appears in real life and can be reproduced easily in an agent-
based model (Axtell, 2005).  
This issue is at the centre of much debate among economists. In classical 
economy, agents are considered as rational, having a perfect knowledge of their 
environment, and hence are homogeneous. There were of course discussions 
about this view of agents. It stayed unchallenged for a moment: for example 
Friedman (1953) argued that non-rational agents would be driven out of the 
market by rational agents, who would trade against them and simply earn higher 
profits. However, in the 60’s, the view on rationality evolved. Even Becker (1962) 
suspected that agents could be irrational and produce same outcomes as rational 
agents (i.e. negative slope of market demand curve), but that the interest of 
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describing agents as rational is that one needs not choose the way to represent 
irrationality. The author who definitely changed the view on economic agents is 
Simon, who stated that any individual could be seen as a “boundedly rational” 
agent, which means that it has an imperfect knowledge and has limited computing 
abilities (Simon, 1955). In most markets, agents have no perfect knowledge about 
the behavior and preferences of other agents, which makes them unable to 
compute an optimal choice to make. If they do have perfect knowledge, they will 
require unlimited computational capacity in order to calculate their optimal 
choices1.  
Indeed, for some contemporary authors, the understanding that one can get of real 
market dynamics is more accurate if the assumption of a representative agent or of 
homogeneity of agents is dropped, at the same time as the perfect knowledge 
assumption (Kirman, 2001). The way bounded rationality is approach can be very 
formal and tentatively predictive (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but some 
authors go even further by stating that the notion of rationality has been 
abandoned to be changed to the idea that agents possess rules of behaviors that 
they select thanks to diverse mechanisms, which are most of the time based on 
past evaluation of actions (Kirman, 2001). Some authors also compare the 
difference of results one can get when dealing with a representative agent 
approach and a bounded rationality approach for agent, and try to integrate both 
simplicity and complexity of these two points of view (Hommes, 2007). 
To complete the view that agents are boundedly rational in a market, and that they 
evolve through time, it is necessary to consider one more aspect of their belonging 
to a complex system: their interactions. The seminal works on markets with 
interacting heterogeneous agents date back to the beginning of the 90’s, with the 
                                                
1 For example, an issue that anyone representing learning (not only on market) has 
to face is the exploration-exploitation dilemma. When an action gives a reward 
that is considered as “good”, the agent performing it must decide to carry on with 
this action, and hence maybe miss other more rewarding actions, or to search, 
which implies indeterminate outcomes. Leloup (2002), using the multi-armed 
bandit (Rothschild, 1974) to represent this dilemma, showed that a non-optimal 
learning procedure could lead to a better outcome that an optimal – but non 
computable – procedure. 
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edition in the US of the Santa Fe institute book where many financial markets 
were represented (Arthur et al., 1997), which was a book gathering many authors 
having done this kind of work during the 1990’s (Palmer at al., 1993). Since then, 
a large part of research in agent-based simulation concerns market situation, as 
can for example be seen in the cycles of WEHIA / ESHIA conferences and ESSA 
conferences. The former ones gather many physicists who apply dynamic systems 
techniques to representing heterogeneous interacting agents to deal with 
economics issues, and they tend to buy the “agent-based computational 
economics” (ACE) approach of simulated markets promoted by Leigh Tesfatsion2 
(Phan, 2003). In the later ones, not only economy, but also sociology, renewable 
resources management, computer science participate and try often to generate 
subtle representation of cognition and institutions and a strong view of agents as 
computerized independent entities to deal with broad social issues and being 
closer to multi-agent social simulation (MAS). Now we will refer to both terms 
(ACE or MAS) independently.  
Not only the techniques can be different pursued when studying markets with 
distributed agents but also the aims can be. Some try to infer theoretical results 
about rationality and collective actions (Vriend, 2000) or about market processes 
(Weisbuch et al., 2001). Others want to create algorithms to represent human 
rationality on markets, and try to assess the value of algorithms that they use, 
comparing the simulated behavior with actions of real humans so that to 
understand the latter a bit more (Hommes and Lux, 2007 ; Duffy, 2001 ; Arthur 
1994). Eventually some explorations about the impact of diverse rationalities in a 
market context enable the identification of possible worlds using a sort of artificial 
society approach (Rouchier et al., 2001).  
 
Being part of a text book, this chapter should provide tools to be able to build and 
use agent-based simulation techniques to create artificial markets and analyze 
results. However, a “know-how” description of the building of artificial market is 
so dependent on the type of issue that is addressed, than it was decided here to 
establish a classification of the type of markets and modeling techniques that can 
be found in agent-based simulation research. We are interested in representations 
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of markets that focus on a micro-representation of decision processes, with limited 
information or limited computational abilities for agents, and which takes place in 
a precise communication framework. This form of representation forces authors to 
focus on new notions such as interaction or information gathering, and this 
induces new issues such as the bases for loyalty or the exploration-exploitation 
dilemma. The use of stylized facts is fundamental in this branch, where modelers 
try to mimic some elements of the world in their research, focusing either on 
representations of reasoning that are inferred from observed micro behaviors, or 
trying to mimic global behavior through learning algorithms, thereby to stay 
closer to common view orthodox economics.  
Contrary to this view, which does not distinguish among individual rationalities 
and assumes aggregate, centralized knowledge and decision making, researchers 
involved in the use of multi-agent simulation usually try to understand the local 
point of view of agents, and its influence on global indicators. Since the agent is 
then seen as unable to have complete knowledge, it has to accumulate data about 
its environment and treat those data according to its aims. The study of markets is 
interesting when it comes to this type of analysis because markets display a much 
more simple set of possible actions and motivations than many other social 
settings. Income and reproduction of activity are direct motivations, which imply 
choices in the short and the long term, prices and quantities are what have to be 
chosen (as well as sometimes acquaintances, in the case of bilateral bargaining) 
and information is limited to offers and demands, as well as responses to these 
two types of proposals.  
This chapter presents the main fields of application for multi-agent simulation 
dealing with markets, to show how researchers have focused on different aspects 
of this institution and to conclude on the great interest of agent-based simulation 
when trying to understand the very dynamics of these social environments.  
We will describe the main notions that are covered by the term “market” in agent-
based literature, and also the main ways to represent rationality and learning that 
can be found. Then, the main topics of market studies will be described in three 
parts. In section 3, agents are on a market and actually meet others individually, 
having private interactions with each other. Choices that have to be modeled are 
about matching, as well as about all buying or selling decisions. In all other 
sections, agents are facing an aggregate market and they have to make decisions 
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based on global data, sometimes associated to networks. In part 4 agents are either 
consumers or producers in a large market. In part 5 we will deal with auctions, 
financial markets and market design.  
2 Market and agents’ reasoning 
In recent years the study of market(s) has been predominantly carried on by 
economists. Ethnographers and sociologists have been active in this domain 
(Geertz et al., 1979; White, 1988), and the field is now being developed through 
field studies and analysis. The main difference for those two approaches is that 
economists generally build models which are rather abstract and formal, whereas 
ethnologists and sociologists describe actual markets after observing them and 
generally produce models that are based on classifications of large amount of 
data. The notion of market itself has a double meaning, even more important with 
the increasing use of internet: it is at the same time the institution that enables 
individuals to coordinate their actions through the fixing of a price or, 
alternatively, a physical place where buyers meet sellers. There is no easy 
decision to choose the scale to study when dealing with market, neither is the limit 
of observation that is needed in the supply chain to understand a phenomena easy 
to set. In agent-based simulation, markets are represented as closed societies with 
a specified of agents (market being open or closed to new entry) that are possibly 
interconnected. 
Simulations can be based on very specific case studies and in order to describe as 
accurately as possible the behavior of real actors, but they can also be mainly 
theoretic and in an attempt to generate expected theoretical results. In all cases, a 
simulated market cannot be implemented as described in neoclassical economic 
theory since agents need to be independently specified and interact directly with 
one another during the simulation. For example, to develop a model where 
individual agents have to make a decision, a demand curve (that gives for any 
price of a good, the number of agents that are ready to buy or sell at this price) 
cannot be imposed on the model but has to be derived from the determinants of 
agent behavior. One approach is to distribute reservation prices (the maximum 
price for buying or minimum for selling) among agents which can then be used to 
aggregate demand and offer curves.  
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The main elements to define a market model are given in the next section. We will 
then describe a few approaches to rationality and learning for agents in markets 
that depend on the type of market and goods that are represented. A similar 
analysis, more oriented towards consumers’ behavior can be found in (Jager, 
2007) 
Main elements to build an artificial market 
Several dimensions are important on a market, and each description of an element 
is easy to relate to a dimension in the building of an artificial system with agents 
(simply put: the market institution and the agents’ rules of behavior). Axtell 
(2005) proposes a very abstract view of decentralized exchange on an agent-based 
market, where he gives no explanation of the bargaining process that organizes 
the exchange, but shows the existence of a computationally calculable equilibrium 
to increase all agents’ utility. Here, the aim is to find out actual processes that can 
be used by modelers to represent markets.  
The first classification that can be made in the building of a model is to know if 
one is building the representation of a speculative market or a goods market. What 
I call a speculative market, typically a financial one, is such that agents who have 
a good can keep it, sell it or buy it. They have to anticipate on prices and wait to 
perform their actions so as to make the highest profit. Seminal work on agent-
based simulation were related to speculative markets, which display interesting 
regularities in their stylized facts. A large body of literature has developed on this 
topic, which is also due to the fact that data to calibrate models are more easily 
available than for non-speculative markets. On a goods market, agents have only 
one role, to sell or buy a certain number of units, and they usually have a 
reservation price to limit the prices they can accept. The good can be perishable 
(with an intrinsic value that decreases over time) or durable so that stock 
management is an issue in case of good markets.  
Then, both types of market can be organized either through auctions (with diverse 
usual institution: double-auction, ascending, descending, with posted prices or 
continuous announcements) or via pair-wise interactions which imply face-to-face 
negotiation (with many different institutions, such as “take-it-or-leave-it”, one 
shot negotiation, a series of offers and counter-offers, the possibility for buyers to 
explore several sellers or not). In the institutional design, it can also be important 
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to know if money exists in the system or if agents exchange one good for another 
directly.  
Agents cognition must entail some choice algorithm. Agent-based simulation is 
almost always used to design agents with bounded rationality because agents have 
limited computational abilities or limited access to information. They have tasks 
to perform, within a limited framework, and have to make decisions based on the 
context they can perceive. Most of the time, they are given a function, equivalent 
to a utility function in economics, that associates a value to each action, enabling 
the agents to classify the profit it gets and hence to compare actions. First, an 
agent must have constraints in its actions, so that to be able to make an arbitrage 
between all possible options:  
- Each good is associated to a reserve price: if a buyer (resp. seller) goes on 
a market, there is a maximum (resp. minimum) price it is willing to pay for 
the good.  
- The importance of getting a good can be indicated by using a price of 
entry on the market. Agents have a greater incentive to buy and get a 0 
profit, rather than not buying. The constraint for selling can be the same.  
- In some papers, the price is not represented in the system, and the 
acquisition of a good is limited by a utility function, where the agent 
acquires a good if and only if it gives enough profit.  
- In the case of negotiation, time constraint is usually put on buyers who can 
visit a limited number of sellers, having hence a limit on their search for 
good.  
- There can be a discount factor: at each period, the risk of seeing the 
market close is constant and hence agents never know if they will be able 
to trade at the next period. 
The type of decisions that agents have to perform on a market: 
- for buyers: which number of units to buy, who to visit, how to decide to 
stay in a queue depending on its length, which price to propose / accept, 
which good to accept, and more fundamentally participate or not. 
- for sellers: how to deal with the queue of buyers (first-come-first -served 
or with a preference over the identity of buyers), which offer to make or 
accept, and in the case of repeated markets how to decide the number of 
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units to buy for the next time step, in the case of a market where quality is 
involved: which type of good to propose or build for the next time step.  
Of course, because of the increasing complexity when adding one decision in a 
model, it is rare that all of these decisions should be made in one single model. 
For example, although interactions could potentially be represented in a 
continuous way, I know of no model where it is the case: all choices and meetings 
are made and messages sent at discrete time-steps.  
 
Agents’ learning 
As said before, in most markets that are studied with agent-based models, the 
central element is that agents are heterogeneous in knowledge as well as in need. 
This situation can be decided from initialization or can emerge during the course 
of the simulation, while agents learn. Another element that is rarely given at 
initialization but is acquired by agents while learning is information about other 
agents’ characteristics. In most cases, this learning takes place as a result of 
action, at the same time as the acquisition of an object or the acquisition of 
money.  
The way learning is organized is generally linked to a performance of actions, 
with a selection of actions that “satisfice” or give the best performance. On a 
market, it is often assumed that agents are interested in getting the highest payoff 
for their individual actions: the performance is either the profit that agents get 
from their sells or the utility they get from consuming the product. In most 
models, learning agents have a set of pre-defined actions they can take and they 
have to select the one they like the best, following a probabilistic choice. One of 
the simplest learning models is reinforcement learning (Erev et al. 1999; Bendor 
et al. 2001; Macy and Flache 2002), where agents attribute a probability of choice 
for each possible action that follows a logit function. The algorithm includes a 
forgetting parameter and a relative weight attributed to exploitation (going to 
actions known as having high value) and exploration (the random choice part in 
the system). The exploration parameter can be fixed during the simulation, where 
the level of randomness has to be chosen, or can vary during the simulation 
(increase) so that there is a lot of exploration at the beginning of the simulation 
and as time passes agents focus on the “best” actions. This issue of which level of 
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exploration and exploitation to put in a learning algorithm is of current concern in 
the literature about markets (Moulet and Rouchier, 2007). Another model of 
rationality for agents is based on a representation of strategies of other agents, 
fictitious play: a distribution of past actions is built by each agent an can then 
infer the most probable set of actions of others, and hence choose their optimal 
behaviour (Boylan et El-Gamal, 1993). EWA model has been proposed by 
Camerer (Camerer and Ho, 1999) to gather both characteristics of these models: 
the agent not only learns what profit it got for each action, but also computes 
notional gains for each possible action, and attributes the resulting notional profit 
to each of those possible actions. A slightly more complex representation of 
knowledge commonly found in the literature is the classifier-system where each 
decision is made by considering a context, a choice and the past profit made in 
this precise context by making this special choice (Moulet and Rouchier, 2007). 
This type of algorithm is very similar to what (Izquierdo et al. 2004) call case-
based learning, but it does not seem to be applied to market situations. In general 
the number of possible actions is fixed from the beginning, but the classifier 
system can be associated to a genetic algorithm that generates new rules over the 
time (M.KOPEL H. DAWID Olivier 97). Genetic Algorithm learning is also a 
quite usual way to represent learning, where the information that is used by agents 
to estimate the profit of each rule can be based on actual past actions (Vriend, 
2000) or also on the imaginary profit of all possible actions considering the 
actions of others (Hommes and Lux, 2007). The presence of other agents can also 
be relevant information when agents use imitation or social learning.  
Brenner3 (2006) undertook an extensive review of usual learning processes. In this 
paper, an interesting element is developed: the way “satisficing” rationality can be 
developed, where agents do not look for the best action but for one which enables 
them to get a “good enough” profit, the notion of “good enough”, called 
“aspiration level” than can evolve during the simulation (Cyert and March, 1963).  
An alternative to learning algorithms that are only based on profit is to consider 
that agents have a social utility, which need not have the same dimensionality as 
                                                
3 The main objection to Brenner’s exposition is the lack of homogeneity of 
notation, which makes the algorithms difficult to compare and maybe to 
implement. 
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profit. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that translating the social utility in costs 
or profits that can be added to monetary profit gives a dynamics of learning and 
behavior that is radically different from a situation where agents reason in two 
dimensions, social and monetary, with a lexicographic ordering (Rouchier et al., 
2001). A way to implement social utility without lexicographic ordering is to 
include in the utility the appreciation of similarity of members of the network, 
such as in consumer choice models (Delre at al., 2007).  
In most models, action and information gathering are made in one action, and 
circulation of information as such is not really modelled. The reason is certainly 
because it would take modellers too far from the neoclassical economic approach 
to market, where the only information is the observation of transactions, 
sometimes of intermediate prices as in auctions or, sometimes, bargaining. One 
model of market by Moss (2002) represents communication among agents before 
exchange takes place and Rouchier and Hales (2003) (which model evolved into 
the one of Rouchier (2004)) also allocates one period out of three every time-step 
for agents to look for information.  
Indicators and method 
Several points of view can be found in papers about markets, just like for any 
work in simulation. Some prefer to work at a purely abstract level and others try 
to fit as well as possible data that they extract from observation and experience. 
Whatever the approach, indicators that are often observed in markets are prices, 
efficiency (the total profit that is extracted from agents compared to the maximum 
profit that could be extracted), and relative power of different agents. The notion 
of convergence is central to the modeling of markets, since most research refers to 
economics and has to compare results to economic static equilibrium. In some 
cases, what is observed is interaction patterns, which can be represented as the 
random part of the choice of agents when interacting (the disorder), the number of 
different sellers that a buyer meets in a number of steps. In bargaining models and 
in general exchange models, the existence of an exchange or not is also something 
that is observed. Sometimes, the cognition of agents itself is observed: their belief 
about the others preferences, or even the distribution of propensities to choose 
sellers. 
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Among all the data that can be observed in the model, these last ones cannot be 
observed in real life, and hence cannot be compared to human systems. In a lot of 
models, agents’ behavior is compared to that of humans in order to establish the 
validity of the cognitive model, expressed as an algorithm. The data are very 
rarely extracted from real life situation (although it sometimes happens), but are 
mainly constructed via experiments. Experimental economists control all 
information circulation and record all actions of agents. It is thus possible to 
compare in a very precise and quantitative way the global behavior of the group 
and individual behavior, on one side with artificial agents and on the other side 
with human agents. Real life situation can also be seen as the mix of human and 
of artificial agents, such as in financial online markets.  
Other researchers do not want to match data too precisely. As Vriend says 
(Vriend, 2005), agents based models, like any other models, are abstract settings 
that have to be interpreted as such. The comparison between real and abstract data 
should go through a first step which is the building of stylized facts that are 
already a summary of human behaviors, where only the most striking elements are 
integrated. Vriend is much more interested by the reaction of his abstract model 
when parameters change, and by its self-consistency. It could be said that by 
construction, a model can only capture a small part of human cognition, which is 
full of long-term experiments and memories, and should not be compared to 
quantitative data without caution.  
Eventually, some researchers want their model to influence real life and try to use 
the results they find to give advices on the way to build markets. Different ways to 
fit models with real life will be found in each example of a model – be it to fit 
precisely, to fit stylized facts, or to be an abstract study of the effect of some rules 
in a social setting.  
3 Buyer-seller interactions 
In the literature about agent-based markets, a great attention has been given to the 
analysis of local interactions, hardly ever studied in classical economics, apart 
from rare exceptions (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985). An aim is to reproduce as 
well as possible the features of real markets. It is indeed to be noticed in real 
observation that buyers display regularity in the choice of sellers with whom to 
interact and that this regularity emerges in time with experience - this attempt to 
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reproduce patterns of interaction is the only way to understand, rather than just 
describe, the way individuals coordinate (Weisbuch at al., 2000). Authors study 
with great care local bargaining processes, as well as repetition of interactions 
over several days, where choices are not only based on prices but also on the fact 
that buyers need to buy and sellers to sell. The basic feature of these models is 
pair-wise interactions on markets with several sellers and buyers where prices are 
not posted and result from negotiation only. The number of visits buyers can 
make, the way sellers manage queues or the number of steps of the negotiations 
are different in all these systems that focus only on small parts of the whole set of  
stylized facts that are observable on such markets. Some aspects that are often 
studied are here described and the subsequent choices for modeling the 
organization of pair-wise interactions are given.  
Bargaining processes 
Brenner (2002) studies agents’ learning in a bilateral bargaining market, focusing 
on the convergence of prices and the dynamics of bargaining. There is one good 
in the market, and buyers and sellers meet at every step to exchange this good. 
Each buyer can choose one seller for each market step, and it chooses according 
to the fact that the price is acceptable. The seller answers to buyers that wait in the 
queue in the order of arrival by proposing a price. Buyers have to decide who to 
visit; sellers have to decide on the first price to propose and then on the number of 
successive proposals it will make if the buyer rejects the offer, bargaining being 
costly for both agents. All decisions are made following reinforcement learning 
based on past experience. Hence, all choices are based on the satisfaction that is 
associated to each past action and on a rigidity variable. A buyer will carry on 
with choosing a seller as long as he is satisfied. His probability to change depends 
on his expectations with another agent. A seller also calculates the probability to 
change behavior depending on the belief he has on what he would gain by 
performing another choice.  
The rigidity parameter, which is the opposite of noise in the system, has a great 
impact on results. If rigidity is high, buyers keep visiting the same seller. The cost 
of bargaining also is important: if it is not very low, sellers learn to offer the price 
they know to be acceptable to buyers, and they do not bargain after a few rounds. 
In this system, since the relations are so individual, the convergence of price is not 
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very fast and can be highly variable for a long time, although converging in the 
end. The model is extremely sensitive to all parameters that define aspiration 
levels for agents.  
Brenner’s paper is of the class that compares simulation to theoretical results. 
Here, sub-game equilibria are used to compare the possible outcomes and their 
efficiency to the generated prices and behaviors. There is no reference to any real 
world data. However, it is interesting that both micro behavior (the number of 
bargaining steps) and macro data (prices) are of importance, justifying an agent-
based analysis.  
 
Influenced by this paper, but referring to real data, Moulet and Rouchier (2007) 
reported a bargaining model based on two sets of data: qualitative, from a field 
study in the wholesale market of Marseilles by Rouchier (Rouchier and Mazaud, 
2004), and quantitative, giving all proposals, intermediate and final prices for a 
series of transactions in the same market (Kirman et al., 2007). Like the previous 
model, the market gathers buyers and sellers who meet at every time-step. 
However, buyers can visit several sellers in one market opening. The choice of 
buyer has several dimensions: to decide which seller to visit, to decide to accept 
an offer or to reject it, to propose a counter-offer or leave, and then which value to 
counter-offer. Sellers must choose the first price to offer, to accept buyer’s 
counter offer or not, and eventually decide on the value of the second offer they 
can make. In this model, decisions evolve following classifier system learning, 
where each agent evaluates a list of possible options following his past 
experience. The results that are produced are compared with indicators derived 
from real-world data: values of offers and counter-offers of the agents that vary 
depending of the kind of good that is purchased and ex post bargaining power of 
sellers (which is the difference between the first offer and the price of transaction 
compared to the difference between the counter-offer and the price of transaction). 
In the simulations, the values that are obtained fit the data, quite well in that it 
reproduces the bargaining sequences and agents’ behaviors. The two main 
parameters are the number of sellers that agents can meet (from one to four) and 
the speed of learning of sellers. The relative importance of learning for the agents 
can be seen as situating them in a negotiation for in-season goods and a 
negotiation for out-of-season goods. The model produces results similar to those 
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of out-of-season goods when agents have to learn repeatedly, when there is no 
known market price but a lot of heterogeneity in the readiness to pay of buyers. In 
the case of in-season goods, the market price is more settled, and agents do not 
explore the possible values of goods as much, relying instead on their experience. 
Between the different in-season goods, the main difference could be the number 
of visits buyers make, but this number tends to reduce after a learning period, 
when buyers have selected their preferred seller. This aspect of the model – the 
growing loyalty of agents – is not the center of the research and was represented 
mainly with the aim of matching the actual behaviors of the market actors. Other 
papers, described in the following section, are more focused on this issue.  
 
Another direction for the study of bargaining processes is related to the creation of 
robots or artificially adaptive agents (AAA) , to participate in electronic 
commerce (Oliver, 1997). Such models focus on negotiations that are complicated 
in terms of business situation in that they integrate several dimensions of trade in 
the deal: price, quantity and delivery time. The main argument for the value of the 
algorithm that is proposed in the paper is that the agents learn to negotiate at least 
“as well as humans”, which means that as many negotiations lead to an agreement 
as in human bargaining situations so that profit is extracted from both sides of the 
bargaining. The bargaining is constituted of several steps, where a customer reacts 
to the first offer by comparing its profit to a threshold, and the offer is accepted if 
it is higher than the threshold and rejected with a counter-offer that is made in the 
opposite case. Clearly, such models capture satisficing and bounded rationality 
rather than profit maximization. The bargaining can then carry on with several 
successive offers being made by customer and seller. Strategies for accepting and 
counter-offering evolve through a Genetic Algorithm. Five different games are 
used to test the learning, in a population of 20 agents with 3 rounds of bargaining 
at most and each agent is given 20 chromosomes for decision making. It is then 
proven that AAA perform better than random, that agents are able to learn general 
strategies that can be used against different bargaining partners, and eventually 
that AAA perform as well as humans (depending on the game, sometimes better 
and sometimes worse, maybe depending on affective values for humans) in terms 
of number of agreements that are reached. This is an interesting result to consider 
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when one wants to introduce artificial agents into electronic markets, since one 
wants then to be able to reach as many agreements as possible.  
Loyalty  
Loyalty is present in quite a few models of markets where agents interact 
repeatedly. It is popular to deal with this topic with agents, mainly because it is 
related to two main advances of agent-based modeling: heterogeneity and 
interactions. There exists two representations of this loyalty in the literature, either 
fixed loyalties assumed in order to understand its impact (Rouchier, 2004) or 
emerging loyalties, as the result of endogenous interactions. Vriend refers to 
“endogenous interactions” when he uses individual learning to generate an 
evolution of interactions among agents (Vriend, 2005). The idea is that agents 
learn to select which actions to perform as well as which agent to interact with; it 
is clear that this can lead to the apparition of loyalty, and that it can take different 
regular patterns.  
 
One main field where this loyalty issue has been important is the study of 
perishable good markets (fruits and vegetables and fish). Indeed, in real situation, 
the participants of these markets are very dependent on the regularity, which 
implies predictability, of their interactions. The main reason is that buyers need to 
purchase goods almost every day: they have very little ability to stock and they 
must provide their customers with all possible goods (a retailer without carrots 
can turn to be unattractive just because of this lack). In case of shortage, they need 
to have good relations with a seller to make sure the good will be available to 
them. Conversely, Rouchier (2004) shows in a model that the presence of loyal 
agents in a perishable good market is necessary for the sellers to predict the right 
number of goods to provide every day. In this artificial market, two types of 
buyers interact with sellers: those that look for the cheapest prices 
(“opportunistic”) and those that are faithful and try to get the good rather than to 
get it cheap (“loyal”). To be able to be opportunistic, agents first gather 
information about prices, and then decide on the seller they want to meet to make 
the best transaction. The more opportunistic agents are present in the market, the 
more garbage is produced and shortage take place. Although there is some 
randomization of needs for the buyers, the presence of loyal agents makes the 
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sellers estimate their stocks in the best way. This result stands for different 
learning algorithms (step by step learning, simple reinforcement learning and 
classifier systems). Considering that the field study on the fruits and vegetables 
market of Marseilles, France, showed that most of the agents are loyal (according 
to the definition of the model: first loyal and then try to find all the goods in a 
minimum of visits to sellers), this result can give a functional explanation to their 
action choices. 
 
In a slightly different context, Rouchier has represented the shape of emerging 
patterns of relations that could be created by two types of rationality with agents 
(Rouchier, 2001). The situation is a market-like situation, where the offer is 
depending of the preceding step situation, since it was a renewable resource. 
Agents were herdsmen and farmers, and the later were selling an access to their 
land. If no one or if too many herdsmen were coming on a land, it would get 
depleted, and hence the offer would be reduced. Two types of micro behavior 
were defined: either herdsmen would choose the cheapest farmers, or they would 
choose the ones that are offered them an access the most often. In the first case, 
the created situation was a depletion of the resource, with congestion of demand 
for the cheapest farmers. The links that were created were highly stable (once an 
agent found the cheapest it would not change), but on the other hand agents could 
not readapt when there was a shock in the resource quantity (a drought) because 
everyone would converge to the same farms. With the second rationality, agents 
had a representation of a “good” farmer, which was only based on individual 
experience, and hence they would be heterogeneous. They would also have 
several “good” farmers to visit in case one was not available. This made them 
much more flexible in their choice, and it would suppress the depletion of the 
resource, and everyone would be better off. The macro situation, although the 
process is different, also shows that a loyal micro-behavior is a help to repartition 
of goods were there can be shortages. In this setting the loyal micro-behavior also 
enables a more equal repartition of gain among farmers as well as herdsmen.  
 
Vriend and Kirman (2000) explored the emergence of loyalty in an artificial 
market which representation is based on a field study in the fish market of 
Marseille. The aim is to see loyalty emerge, and in parallel to see which emergent 
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behavior display sellers. They use classifier systems to represent learning, where 
their agents can have a lot of different actions, some of which are, a priori, not 
good for their profit. Through the exploration of good and bad possible actions, 
they select those that bring the highest profit in the past. Some buyers learn to be 
loyal, and those that learn this get higher profit than others in the long term (it is 
actually a co-evolution where sellers learn to offer lower prices to those that are 
loyal). The buyers are then differentiated: their reservation price is heterogeneous 
(for example to represent that they do not sell their fish to the same population, 
some are in rich neighborhood, some in poor ones). Sellers on the market learn to 
discriminate, and they offer higher prices to those that have higher reservation 
prices. Eventually, some of the sellers get themselves specialized since only low 
prices buyers can visit them. Using a very basic learning where agents are not 
rational but learn by doing, the results are very satisfying because they reproduce 
stylized facts of the fish market.  
 
A third model represents the same market but refers much more to quantitative 
data of this market (Weisbuch et al., 2000). The data represents sales that took 
place over more than 3 years and concerns 237162 individuals. From them it is 
possible to observe that buyers that are faithful to a seller are mainly those that 
buy a lot of quantities every month. The model was built in two parts: one which 
is simple enough to generate analytical results and a second that displays more 
realistic hypothesis. In the analytical model, agents use the logit function to select 
their action (basic reinforcement learning), which means that their choice depends 
on a β value, between 0 and infinity, which decrease gives a higher propensity to 
test randomly all sellers and which increase induces a higher propensity to look 
for the best past interaction. Agents can either imitate others or only base their 
choice on their own learning. The results can be found using the mean field 
approach, coming from physics. It is show that there are radically different 
behaviors – either totally loyal or totally “shop around agents” depending non-
linearly of β. The model gets more complex with sellers being able to sell to two 
different prices, high and low. What can happen in that system is that a buyer gets 
loyal to a seller when the price that is asked is low, but that he remains loyal even 
after the price has switched to high. The only important thing is that, as seen 
before, the good is actually provided. One indicators that is used to synthesize 
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diverse information of the model is “order” which the quantity of agents that are 
loyal – the more regular the agents, the more ordered the society. Although the 
results, once interpreted, are very coherent with real data in terms of possible 
states of the market, it is a bit difficult to understand precisely some concepts of 
the paper because it refers mainly to physics indicators that are after translated 
into social indicators, but this translation is not so straightforward.  
Reputation of sellers  
A market has been developed as a benchmark for a reputation-based learning 
algorithm for agents in a social system (Pinyom et al, 2008). The model integrates 
quality and judgment of a relationship. Reputation is used in the group to enable 
agents to gather enough information in a context when it is scarce. The market 
that is used is a rather simple institution, where buyers have to select one seller at 
each time-step to buy one unit of good. The good is different for each seller, being 
defined by one parameter called quality. For a buyer, the acquisition of a good of 
lower quality will give less utility than the acquisition of a good of high quality. 
Sellers have a limited quantity of units, which they can sell at any period (the 
good is non-perishable) and they disappear from the system when they sold 
everything. The relevant information for buyers is first the quality of the good that 
each seller offers. However, when the number of sellers is large, this information 
cannot be captured efficiently if the buyer only learns when he meets a seller. This 
is why information circulates among buyers, who communicate once every time 
step. A buyer who meets a seller forms an image of this seller; a buyer who gets 
information about a seller has access to a reputation of this seller. When giving 
information to another buyer, an agent can decide to give the direct knowledge it 
has (the image it formed of a seller) or the reputation it has already receives 
(which is more neutral since it is not its own evaluation). Reputation can also 
circulate about the buyers, and in that case concerns the validity of the knowledge 
they give about seller. When a buyer is not satisfied with the information given by 
another buyer, it can also retaliate and cheat when this very agent asks him a 
question. 
Pinyom et al. (2007) describe in detail the choices that agents make when asking a 
seller for a good, asking another buyer for information about a seller or a buyer, 
answering a question and the lying process. 
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The simulated market contains a large number of sellers (100 for 25 buyers) – 
simulations are defined by 1/ the type of information that is used by agents (only 
image or image and reputation) and 2/ the number of bad quality sellers in the 
system (99, 95, 90, 50). The addition of reputation in the system makes the 
difference between a normal learning mechanism where buyers select their 
favorite seller and a learning mechanism where they aggregate several quality of 
information to (maybe) become more performing. Actually the results show that 
globally, the agents indeed learn more efficiently when using reputation, in that 
the average quality that is bought is higher. The quantity of information that 
circulate is much higher and this enables buyers to increase their utility. This 
social control mechanism is especially important when quality is really scarce 
(1% of good sellers). This result is all the more interesting than this is a very rare 
case of simulated market where communication among sellers is represented, 
although this behavior is commonly observed in real life situation.   
4 Consumers, producers and chains 
Another way to look at the notion of good market is to consider large markets, 
where individual interactions are not important for the agents who do not record 
the characteristics of the ones they meet, but only the fact that they can or cannot 
perform an exchange. A large market can indeed include numerous goods, that are 
distributed among different other agents and not necessarily easy to access. 
Another interest in large market is to study endogenous preferences for goods, and 
imagine their evolution depending on the type of good and some cognitive 
characteristics of agents. Eventually some authors are interested in the 
coordination process within the supply chain itself, where the issue is about the 
amount of information that each agent has to use so that to anticipate needs for far 
end consumers.   
Multi-good economy  
Two very abstract models of economy can be found where agents have to produce 
a good and consume other goods which they can acquire only through exchanges 
with other agents. The first model was built so that to produce speculative 
behaviors in agents, which means getting a good that has no value for 
consumption but a value for exchange (Duffy, 2001); the second model’s aim is to 
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witness the apparition of commonly used equivalence value for the goods, which 
is analyzed as relative prices (Gintis, 2006). Both models are interesting for their 
pure description of an abstract economy with minimalist but sufficient assumption 
to induce economic exchanges. In the works cited here, the use of these two 
models have different methodological aims: one is purely abstract whereas the 
other tries to refer to experimental results and mimic human players behaviors.  
In his paper, John Duffy (2001) designs a model that was originally proposed by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) to induce some agents to store a good that is not their 
own consumption good and is more costly to store than their own production 
good, just because they think this good is easier to exchange for them. There are 
three different goods in the economy, agents need to consume one unit of good to 
increase their utility and produce one unit of good each time they have consumed 
one. Agent 1 needs good 1 and produces good 2; agent 2 consumes good 2 and 
produces good 3; agent 3 consumes good 3 and produces good 1. To make it 
easier, Kiyotaki and Wright write that agent i consumes good i and produces good 
i+1. Hence agents have to exchange when they want to consume and not all 
agents can be satisfied by just one exchange. Indeed, if two agents exchange their 
own production goods, one can be satisfied but the other would get a useless 
good, which is neither its own production good nor its consumption good. In this 
economy, only bilateral trading exists and it takes place after a random pairing of 
agents. This involves that some agents must keep a good for at least one time step 
after production before getting their consumption good.  
In this economy, speculation is defined as the conservation of the good i+2, since 
the agent does exchange to get this good which it has not produced, only because 
of the chances to use it as an exchange good at the next time-step. Then, the 
economy is made non-symmetric by having different costs in the conservation of 
goods, here c1>c2>c3. Kyotaki and Wright paper is all about calculating, given 
the conservation costs, the discount factor (the probability that the economy stops 
at the end of a time-step) and the utility of consumption, in which case agents 
decide to get the most expensive good to store or keep their production good. In 
an economy with perfect information, the expected profit for each type of agent 
depends on the proportion of agents 1 holding good 2 (which is 1-number of 
agents 1 holding good 3), proportion of agents 2 holding good 3 and of agents 3 
holding good 3.  
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This centralized knowledge is not what interest John Duffy who tries to see how 
agents could learn which choice to make when they are able to acquire a good 
they do not consume. Especially agents of type 1 are those that should hesitate, 
since good 3 is the most expensive. A lot of models have been built on this topic 
(Basci 1999) already, but what Duffy wants to produce is a setting that is close to 
experiments he has been leading (Duffy and Ochs, 1999) so that to be able to 
judge if his agents are behaving in a way which is coherent with human actors. 
So, from a theoretical setting he builds experiments and simulations, and 
compares all the results this techniques produce. In this paper he therefore 
proposes an algorithm that is close to his intuition of what individuals should do 
(he has also asked questions to people involved in his experiments), and he then 
tries to mimic the results of his experiments, at a global level and a local level. He 
also proposes some original settings where he mixes human agents with artificial 
agents to test at the same time his algorithm and how much he can make the 
human change behaviour depending on the stimuli they get. He is rather satisfied 
with his results, where his model of learning enables to reproduce human 
behaviour correctly. It is possible to discuss his algorithm and his way of 
describing it, since the reproduction of his model is not so straightforward 
(Rouchier, 2003), but all in all, this description of a very basic economy with few 
goods and where agents learn in a way which is close to intuition is a very 
interesting example of market for agent-based modellers.  
 
The paper by Gintis (2006) presents similarities, although the aim and the central 
question are different. The economy that is presented can be seen in a very 
general way and is implemented in only one setting which is described here. In 
the economy there are three goods, and 300 agents. Each agent can produce one 
good and needs to consume both goods it cannot produce; hence it is forced to 
exchange with other agents. At the beginning of each period, an agent only holds 
the good it produces (in a quantity that it can choose and which is costless) and 
can meet two agents, each producing one of the good he needs to acquire. Each 
agent has a representation of “prices”, which is here defined as the equivalence 
quantity between two goods. For this price, there is no common knowledge and 
each one has its own representation. When an agent meets another agent who can 
provide him with the needed good, he offers to trade, by sending as a message its 
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representation of relative “prices” – the exchange takes place at this exchange rate 
if it is acceptable to both agents and the quantities is the highest quantity that both 
can exchange. Agents cannot choose who they meet, they just pick randomly in 
the other producers’ groups. After exchanging, they can consume, which gives 
them utility, and defines a performance for each individual. Learning in this 
system is an event that takes place every 20 period, where the 5% of least 
performing agents (which gets the lowest utility) copy the price representation of 
the most performing agents.  
What is observed in the system is the efficiency of the represented market, 
meaning the sum of all profits, compared to a setting where prices would be 
public. When prices are public, all exchanges can take place since all agents agree 
right away on the equivalence that is proposed and there is no refusal in exchange. 
In the long-term, the system converges to the highest possible efficiency, so 
although the agents have private prices, these prices get to be close enough to 
have regular exchanges. This result in itself in not very surprising in terms of 
simulation (considering the process at stake), but is interesting in economics since 
it gives, at least, a process to attain to a common knowledge which is often 
presupposed to exist.  
Adoption by consumers 
The study of the behavior of large number of consumer facing the introduction of 
new product on a market is a topic that is very interesting to approach with agent-
based simulation, since it allows, once more, to look for the influence of 
heterogeneity of individuals and of networks in the evolution of global results. 
Wander Jager is a prominent character of this area of research, in a position in-
between psychology and marketing. In a paper with Marco Janssen (2003), the 
basic model is presented. The idea behind the study of the acquisition of a new 
product in a group is that agents have a preference that is based on two main 
parameters: the individual preference for the consumption of the product and the 
interest that the agent has to consume the same product as his acquaintances. 
Hence, a utility function that defines the agent depends on this two parameters, 
and this will influence his decision to buy a new product. Agents are 
heterogeneous in such a system, and the representation of “early adopters” (in the 
real world: people who buy a product when it is just released because they know 
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well the interest of new technologies) is modeled by a low need to conform to 
others’ belonging. On the opposite, some agents buy a good only because a lot of 
their acquaintances have already acquired it.  
In Janssen and Jager, 2003, the influence of network size and shape is tested, as 
well as the influence of the utility brought by the product consumption and the 
way agents choose their action. One aspect that is studied is the type of cognitive 
process that can be used by the agent (repetition of the same action; deliberation 
to find a new action; imitation – where other agents’ consumption is imitated; 
social comparison – where other agents’ are imitated based on their utility). This 
indicator is quite rare and shows the psychological grounding of the paper; it is 
interesting here to observe that the cognitive process changes with the utility 
gained by the consumption of the considered product. In a small world network, 
much more products get adopted than in a scale free network, and in the first case, 
agents with a lot of links are very important for the spreading of product adoption. 
A discussion is open here about the type of products, which certainly have 
different influence on the way people copy others – certainly different for milk 
and for computers or clothes. This question is actually developed in another paper. 
 
In Delre and al., 2007, the question that is at stake is to determine how, depending 
on the type of good, how to advertise efficiently. “How to advertise” means here: 
is it better to advertise a lot at the beginning of a campaign, or after a moment; is 
it better to advertise to a large number of people or to disseminate information 
among only a few agents? 
Two products are differentiated: a brown product, which is a high tech and quite 
fancy product that can be compared with other agents of the network (CD, DVD 
player); a white product which is related to basic need and is not really compared 
(fridge or laundry machine). Agents are gathered in networks of different shapes. 
In this model, the heterogeneity is similar in the utility formula as in the preceding 
paper: each one is defined by a propensity to be influenced by others and to be an 
adopter of a new technology. The first finding is that the timing of promotion is 
important to the success of the campaign and that who is being touched as well. 
For a first launch, the best strategy is to « throw gravel », which means that one 
has to make a bit of advertising to a lot of distant small and cohesive groups of 
consumers, that will then convince their network neighbors. Another element is 
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that not too many people must be touched at first, since if they see that others 
have not adopted the good, they might not want it and become impossible to 
convince afterwards. This is mainly true for the white good, where it is better to 
advertise largely when at least 10% of agents have already adopted the good, 
whereas with brown good the takeoff is much faster and a campaign helps to 
takeoff.  
 
The issue of the adoption of a practice within a social context has also been 
studied to understand the adoption of electronic trade for consumers (Darmon and 
Torre, 2004). The issue at stake is that it should be logical that everyone turns to 
electronic trade, which reduces transaction and search costs a lot, but we observe 
that a very small proportion of items are yet traded on internet. This iss mainly 
because consumers have not developed special abilities that are associated to this 
interaction device, and do not know how to reduce the risk of performing a bad 
transaction. To study the dynamics of adoption of the electronic institution and 
learning of agents in a risky setting, a simulation model has been built. The 
market is composed of agents who can produce a good and exchange it for the 
good they want to consume (hence all agents are at the same time producers and 
end consumers). Agents and goods are located on a circle, the location of an agent 
defines the “quality” of the good it produces. For consumption, each agent is 
defined by an interval of quality: when consuming a good which quality is within 
this interval (not including its own production good), it will get a strictly positive 
profit. The cost of production is heterogeneous and can be stable during the 
simulation or evolving.  
When trading on the traditional market, an agent can identify the quality of a 
product offered by another agent, but it has to do numerous meetings before 
finding out who he can exchange with (depending on the quantity of agents and of 
its interval of choice). The authors also added a notion of friction, which is a 
probability of succeeding to trade when two agents meet. In the electronic market, 
an agent sees all other agents at once (no search cost), but cannot identify 
precisely the quantity that is offered and evaluates it with an error interval. It 
hence potentially accepts goods that are giving zero utility. Agents are 
heterogeneous in their ability to perceive the quality and learn about this. If agents 
learn through individual learning, then it eliminates an agent from its list of 
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potential sellers whenever the previous trade brought utility. If agents learn 
through collective learning, then a part of the whole society belongs to a 
community that shares information about the quality (location on the circle) of the 
seller they met at this time-step; the agents not belonging to the community learn 
individually. Then in some simulations, for both learning, agents forget a 
randomly chosen part of what they learnt at each time-step.  
In the case of individual learning, the dynamics that is produced depends on the 
production cost, which can change at all time-step (and hence all agent have the 
same average production cost over the simulation) or which can be stable and 
delineate populations with high or low production costs. When the production cost 
changes at each time-step, the main result is that all agents switch to electronic 
market, but in phase. Those that have a good appreciation on quality go to 
electronic market very fast because it is more profitable for them. Their departure 
of the classical market reduces the probability to exchange for the remaining 
agents, who eventually go to electronic market as well. When production cost are 
heterogeneous, some agents cannot switch from classical to electronic because of 
their inadequate production cost. Hence they never learn how to identify quality 
and stay all simulation long in the classical market. When agents forget about 
their learning, then the size of the electronic market does not get as high as with 
perfect learning, and a number of agents do not exchange.  
When agents participate in a community and exchange their information, a highest 
number of agents participate in electronic market and overall a lowest number of 
agents is excluded from exchange. Three groups are created: agents belonging to 
the community, who get the highest pay-off; agents with low production cost or 
high expertise who can go on internet market and make high profit; and the 
remaining agents which sometimes cannot exchange This result is rather coherent 
with what could be expected, but it is interesting to have created it with this 
location-based representation of quality that each individual wants to attain. It is 
especially clear that there is little risk that traditional market should disappear if 
the main assumption of the model (that agents need an expertise that is long to 
acquire before switching to internet market) is true.  
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Decentralized supply chain  
Supply chains are an important aspect of economics, and they are often difficult to 
consider, mainly because their dynamics spreads in two directions: first the length 
of the chain, where suppliers have to adapt to demand and buyer to the speed of 
production so that to be able to put on the end market the right quantity of goods; 
then another dimension is the fact that suppliers as well as buyers in the chain are 
substitutable and that each actor is itself in a market position and can choose 
between several offers or demands. Actually, in agent-based literature, only the 
first issue is treated. The structure of these models is a series of agents, each 
representing a firm, that are link to two agents at most : a supplier and a client 
(except for end supplier and end consumer, of course linked to only one firm). 
Each agent has to decide on its production level at each time-step, knowing that it 
needs to use goods from the preceding firm in the production process. It must then 
anticipate on demand to order enough, before being able to transform the needed 
quantity. Of course, each firm takes some time (number of steps) to transform the 
product and be able to sell and there is a cost in keeping its own production when 
it is not completely sold. 
One very important issue of these chains is at the centre of most research: how to 
avoid bullwhip effect. This effect is a mechanical dynamics that comes from the 
slow spreading of information and delay in answer because of the length of the 
production process in each firm. When there is variability in demand coming from 
end consumers, this variability increases a great deal when it goes in the chain, up 
to the first producer who exhibits the highest variability. This can be very 
annoying for organizations to be trapped in such a negative dynamics. Several 
authors propose algorithms for artificial agents that have to deal with the issue of 
anticipating demand at each stage of the chain. For example Lin and Lin (2006) 
describes a system where artificial agents can interact with real agents (and hence 
be integrated in a real-life company to help deciders) so that to choose the right 
level of production and order to reduce costs. Several learning algorithms are 
tested and their efficiency attested, even in situation where the environment is 
dynamically evolving. The same issue is treated for example by Kawagoe and 
Wada (2005) who propose another algorithm. They also propose a method to 
statistically evaluate bullwhip effect. Their method is different from the usual 
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frequency based statistical measurement (like stochastic dominance) but is based 
on descriptive statistics.  
5 Financial market, auctions 
Financial markets have been one of the first example that were developed to prove 
the interest of Agent-Based modeling. Arthur et al. (1997) indeed reproduced 
some important stylized facts of asset exchanges on a market and is always cited 
as the first important use of this modeling techniques for studying markets. 
Contrary to models that were presented before, there is no direct interaction 
among agents in these models, only observation of price patterns. One rare 
example presented here is an attempt to link a financial market to a consumer 
market such as one that was seen in previous sections. Another type of market 
does not integrate any interaction in the economy is the representation of auctions.    
Financial market 
The literature on financial market is very important in agent based simulation, and 
dates back to the 1990’s (Arthur, ; Arifovic, 1996) and also in the related branch 
which is called econophysics (the use of physic techniques to deal with economics 
issues in systems that are composed of a huge number of simple interacting actors 
(Levy et al., 2000)). A large review of this topic (Lux, tbp) will be published in a 
Handbook of Finance. It describes at the same time the main stylized facts that 
can be found in financial markets (and hence are meant to be reproduced by 
simulation) and some models that are candidate for explaining these facts. 
Another large review by several authors describes several agent-based simulations 
models dealing with financial markets but that are not so right in reproducing very 
general statistical regularities of these markets. (Samanidou et al., 2007). As usual 
in this section I will describe only some models and ways to represent agents 
learning in the context of financial market. The basic structure of the market, 
which defines the type of choice the agent has to make, can vary, as well as the 
aim and methodology of the researcher building these models and this is why 
examples seem to be good to give few complete descriptions instead of very 
generic results.  
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One reason of using agent-based models is to be able to represent heterogeneous 
population of agents, and what is very often found in this research is the 
representation of two type of agents that have different reactions facing 
information: chartists and fundamentalists. Fundamentalists base their investment 
decisions upon market fundamentals such as dividends, earnings, interest rates or 
growth indicators. In contrast, technical traders pay no attention to economic 
fundamentals but look for regular patterns in past prices and base their investment 
decision upon simple trend following trading rules. Computer simulations such as 
those of the Santa Fe artificial stock market (LeBaron et al. (1999), but see also 
e.g. Kirman (1991), Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000), Marsili et al. 2000, 2001) 
have shown that rational, fundamental traders do not necessarily drive out 
technical analysts, who may earn higher profits in certain periods. An 
evolutionary competition between these different trader types, where traders tend 
to follow strategies that have performed well in the recent past, may lead to 
irregular switching between the different strategies and result in complicated, 
irregular asset price fluctuations. Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) have show in 
simple, tractable evolutionary systems that rational agents and/or fundamental 
traders do not necessarily drive out all other trader types, but that the market may 
be characterized by perpetual evolutionary switching between competing trading 
strategies. Non-rational traders may survive evolutionary competition in the 
market (see for example, Hommes (2001) for a survey).  
 
In Hommes and Lux (2007), the model of market that is chosen is the one of 
cobweb experiment, which is a prediction model on a market, not an actual model 
of selling and buying for agents. The model offers however a rational expectation 
value, which serves as a benchmark for the experimenters. The methodology is to 
try to fit agents’ behaviour in an artificial world to real behaviours of individuals 
in experiments. The game is such that participants to the experiments have no 
clear idea of the structure of the market but must however predict the price of the 
next period. Neither do they know how many other agents are present, nor do they 
have in mind the equation that calculates future price based on the realised price 
and the expectations of all participants. The simulations are made based on rather 
simple models of agents, one being genetic algorithm, simple learning that copies 
past prices, and also reinforcement learning. What interests the authors most is the 
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GA learning, which is the only one to fit stylized facts in different treatments. 
What the GA learns about is a 40 bit string of 0 and 1 that represents two values, 
α between 0 and 1 with 20 bits and β with the remaining 20 bits, that predict price 
at t+1 depending on price at t with p(t+1) = α + β (p(t) - α).  
There are three treatments both for experiments and for simulations, with one 
parameter defining the stability of the price, being high, medium or low. The 
genetic algorithm being varied for different mutation rates, it is proven to be 
largely better than other learning procedures that have been implemented. 
“Better” means here that it fits the stylized facts that have been produced by 
humans in experiments: (1) the mean price is close to rational expectation, and the 
more stable the market, the closest to this rational expectation value; (2) There is 
no significant linear autocorrelation in realized market prices. The reason of the 
good fit of GA is given by authors, which is really interesting because it is not 
obvious to imagine how GA, which are a random learning process with selection, 
should be similar to human learning. They assume that two facts create a learning 
that is similar to human one: the fact that successes are selected positively and that 
there is heterogeneity of the strategies among the set that agents can use. Once the 
assessment of the model is thus done, it is used to question the stability of the 
results of the learning process. One question that arises is to wonder whether 
humans would adapt the same way when interacting in a very large group as they 
do in a small group of 6. This opens many questions on the scalability of results 
concerning market dynamics.  
 
In the paper that is described now, the interaction of agents is direct and not 
necessarily via price system, as usual in financial markets. Hoffman et al. (2007) 
indeed consider that many agent-based simulations still take little interest in 
representing actual behaviours of decision makers in financial markets. They 
argue that Takahashi and Terano (2003) is the first paper to integrate theories that 
come from behavioral finance and represent multiple type of agents, such as 
overconfident traders. In their own paper, Hoffman et al. (2007) present 
SimStockExchange™, their platform, with agents performing trades and making 
decision according to news they perceive and prices they anticipate. They argue 
that their model is based on several theories that are empirically sound and that 
they check their model thanks to simulations which results are compared to the 
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Dutch market along a few years. As usual, the platform allows many variations 
(increase the number of different shares, of agents, change the characteristics of 
agents) but is tested only with some values of parameters.  
Agents receive news that they forget after one time-step, and then can perform 
two types of action: either sell their stock (if they expect to loose at the next time-
step) or buy more shares (in the opposite case). To make sure that they are not 
making mistakes, agents can use risk-reducing strategies, which can be clarifying 
strategies (such as collecting more data) or simplifying strategies (i.e. imitating 
other agents), as well as purely individual (the first one) or social (the later). In the 
presented simulation, strategies are always social, and hence Agents’ confidence, 
C, determine their use of risk reducing strategies, and these confidence were 
deduced from empirical studies. Each agent is also defined by a tendency R to 
perform simplifying strategy or clarifying one. R and C are evaluated on the basis 
of surveys made with investors. Agents are imbedded in networks that can have 
two shapes – a Torus network, and a Scale-free one – and from which they 
acquire the information from others or choose to imitate them. The market itself is 
designed as an order book, where sells and buys are written, with quantity and 
price, and are erased as soon as an agent answers positively to this proposal. The 
market price is the average of all proposed bids and asks of the order book – 
hence it is not a realized price (average transactions’ price) but an aggregation of 
desired prices for agents.  
In the results, some statistical properties of the stock exchange have been 
reproduced. For example, with weekly data of Dutch stock exchange, linear auto-
correlation can be observed, and it is much better reproduced by torus network 
than scale-free one. When it comes to volatility clustering, it is clear that torus 
network display differences from Scale-free network and real data, by showing a 
lot of volatility clustering. This can be due to the speed of circulation of 
information that disseminates this information so fast that it reduces the shocks 
that it can cause. The main aspect of the SSE that has to be better modeled is the 
news arrival, which is a normal distribution around the present price. Maybe this 
can have a large impact since the use of different networks integrates the 
importance of information spreading. 
31 
Relation between two markets 
Sallans et al (2003) report a model where two types of markets are integrated: a 
financial market and a good market in the same system. Consumers, financial 
traders and production firms are interacting and the aim is to understand how 
these two markets influence each other. The good is perishable, and hence needs 
to be purchased regularly. Consumer make purchase decisions; firm get income 
on the sales and update products and pricing policies based on performances; 
traders have shares which they can hold, sell or buy. The product features are 
describe by two binary strings of 10 bits, consumers look for special features in 
the market, and firm choose the feature of the good they put on the market. In 
choosing actions, the firm uses an action-value function that integrates 
expectations about future rewards (firms are not myopic agents), by taking into 
account the evolution of the price of its share in the financial market and the profit 
made by selling products on the market. Consumers have preferences on features 
of a product and its price, and compare any available product to these preferences: 
they can choose not to buy if the product is too different from their preferences. In 
the financial market, agents build expectations and built representation of future 
values by projecting actual and past values in the future. They are parted in two 
groups: fundamentalists (use past dividend for projection) and chartists (use the 
history of stock prices); they are also heterogeneous in time horizon. The market 
clearing mechanism is a sealed bid-auction and the price is chosen to maximize 
the number of exchanges (and randomly among different prices if they produce 
the same trade volume).  
Since agents from the financial market and those from the firm have different 
views on the future of the firm, and evaluate future gains in a different way, 
leading to impact on the firm performance that are not necessarily positive. The 
simulations’ aim is to prove that the model can be used, in certain parameter 
settings, to reproduce stylized facts of markets.  
Although the central issue is very interesting, the paper itself is not as helpful as 
could be to understanding the dynamics of two markets. In particular, the stylized 
fact are not very explicit in the paper (appear only once at the end, when obtained 
results are given). They are classical in financial market analysis, but not clearly 
shown here: low autocorrelations in stock returns, high kurtosis in marginal 
return, volatility clustering. Hypothesis on behavior are never explained, hence 
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there is no understanding of why the stylized facts can be achieved, apart from 
doing some parameter space random exploration. Although the main issue of the 
paper is really fascinating, the results are a bit frustrating because the paper is 
very redundant and self-justified, and hence the reciprocal influence of these 
market, so important in our real world, stay undisclosed.  
Double auctions 
In economics double-auction is a very fascinating topic, since it is an extremely 
stable institution in which predictions can be translated from theory to real life, 
which is not really the case for most economic systems. When putting real people 
in a double-auction setting, one can observe that the convergence to equilibrium 
price occurs. This does not mean that this institution is efficient, since a lot of 
exchanges take place out of equilibrium price, but at least there is a tendency for 
the group to converge to a price where the highest number of exchange can be 
performed, and hence the highest global profit can be extracted. Many authors 
hence wanted to reproduce double-auction market in artificial society so that to 
understand what is the source of this high efficiency.  
The CDA (continuous double auction) is a two-sided progressive auction. At any 
moment, buyers can submit bids, (offers to buy). Similarly, sellers can submit 
asks (offers to sell). Both, buyers and sellers may propose an offer or accept the 
offer made by others, representing the counteroffers in the market. If a ‘bid’ or 
‘ask’ is accepted, a transaction occurs at the offer price. An improvement rule is 
imposed on new offers entering the market, requiring submitted bids (/ asks) at a 
price to exceed (/ be less than) the standing bid (/ ask). Each time an offer is 
satisfying for one of the participants, she announces the acceptation of the trade at 
the given price, and the transaction is completed. Once a transaction is completed 
the market is cleared (meaning there is no standing bid or ask any more) and the 
agents who have traded leave the market. At that moment, like at the very opening 
of the market, the first offer can take any value, and this proposed price imposes a 
constraint on any following offer. When the market closes, after a time decided 
beforehand, agents, who have not yet traded, are not allowed to continue. In this 
market institution all market events are observed by all (bid, ask, acceptance and 
remaining time before market closing) and hence is said to be common 
knowledge. 
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Using this double-action setting, a seminal paper by Gode and Sunder (1993, 
2004) shows the strength of institutional constraints on the actions of agents. 
Indeed in their setting, agents are perfectly stupid from an economics point of 
view, since they have no understanding of their own interest and that they only 
follow a rule without having strategic behavior. They are called “zero-
intelligence” agents: they are not allowed to sell (/buy) lower (/higher) than their 
reservation price, and they have to bid within the limits that have been put by 
others. With these rules, convergence of prices is obtained, very fast. The 
approach in this paper is quite original in the behavioral economics literature in 
the sense that it is close to an “artificial life approach”. Authors do not pretend to 
study human rationality, but instead focus on the abstract reproduction of 
phenomena. It is interesting to note that is not so easy to design a double-auction 
market, and especially in its continuity. Indeed, in a real situation, if two 
individuals have close reservation price, they will often be able to buy or sell at 
the same moment. Who will be first is not obvious, since people have different 
aspiration for profit. Hence, the way to produce a double-auction for Gode and 
Sunders is to randomly choose an agent between all buyers who can buy or make 
a bid, and then to pick randomly a seller among those who can sell or make an 
offer. After trying several methods, they choose this one, explaining that this is a 
good approximation to continuous actions. 
Their work is widely criticized because they are not interested in rationality but in 
mspecific institutional setting and cannot generalized to diverse settings (Brenner, 
2002). However, their result is important and led a lot of researchers to question 
it. For example Brewer et al. (2002) show that humans have abilities to have 
markets converge when context changes a lot, which Gode and Sunders’ agents 
cannot do. In their setting they organize a double-auction market in which agents 
participate in the public market, but also receive offers from the experimenter in a 
private way. Only one offer is made at a time, and it is the same for all agents that 
are proposed the offer, since the equilibrium has to stay the same. The global 
equilibrium (which value is described in the paper) is thus constant, but 
individuals can have incentives not to participate to the public market if the offer 
is interesting. This does change the performance of zero-intelligence a lot, since 
the prices do not converge anymore in simulations led with this new institution. 
On the opposite, humans performing experiments attain convergence, which could 
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mean that only very specific institutions constrain participants enough so that they 
have no choice but to converge, even while not understanding more than the rules 
(zero-intelligence).  
Another paper has been inspired by Gode and Sunder, but also by the theoretical 
model of Easley and Ledyard (Rouchier and Robin, 2006), and tried to establish 
the main elements that an agent should have in its rationality to be able to choose 
the right action in a context of double-auction. To differentiate among different 
possible learning procedure, a comparison to some experimental results were 
made. Learning procedure was a simple algorithm that made the agent revise its 
reservation price towards past average perceptible prices, but it depended on two 
elements. First, the moment when the agent would change its reservation price 
(i.e. buyer (/seller) accepting higher (/lower) prices), called here the “stress time”, 
could change by increasing after a successful transaction and decrease after a day 
with no transaction. Second the agent could perceive only its own transactions or 
any successful transactions in the market. What was demonstrated in the paper is 
that agent would learn quicker to converge to the equilibrium price (making the 
highest global pay-off) if they did not revise their stress-time and had a global 
perception of prices. This quick learning would at the same time correspond the 
best to the speed of convergence that could be found in experiments. What is a bit 
surprising in this result is that more “clever” agents (reacting to risk and failure 
from one day to another) would neither copy human behavior well nor get to 
efficient situation very fast.  
 
Market design / agent design 
In a chapter of the handbook for computational economics published by 
Tesfatsion and Judd (2007), Robert Marks (2007) reviews recent work in market 
design using agent-based simulation. Market design is the branch of economic 
research which aim is to provide insights about which interaction structure (and 
hence information circulation rules) is the best to obtain certain characteristics out 
of a market. As said repeatedly in this chapter, this choice is crucial to have 
certain part of population have more power than other, or have efficiency attained 
in a short time. Hence, many scientists have been thinking about this issue, using 
game theory (Roth, 1991), as well experimental economics, and more recently 
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computational exploration. As seen before, sophisticated agents are not the one 
who do the best in market situations, and are not the ones that copy humans the 
best.  
When designing an institution it is important to see two problems. First the “aim” 
of the institution should be made clear. For example using Dutch auction has one 
advantage over English auction: it is fast ; double-auction is good because it 
extract the highest global profit for the participants (on both sides), but one could 
wish to extract the highest profit for buyers only, for example. Since not all good 
aspects can be achieved in one institution (see for example Myerson and 
Satterthwaite, 1983). Lebaron (2005) explains that the fitness of a model is as 
important as all other elements (what is traded, what are the motivation of agents, 
what is the interaction and information circulation organised, …). This trade-off 
between different characteristics to achieve is already a huge choice before 
starting the design.  
Then one has to think on how to achieve this aim. It is indeed not easy to know 
how individuals will react to an interaction and information constraint. The basic 
use of agent-based simulation can then be to either test a certain rationality of 
agent and compare institution to see what difference it makes in prices (or other 
indicators) (Audet at al. 2002; Bottazzi et al. 2003; Moulet and Kirman, 2008) or 
be used to test different learning algorithms in the same setting (Chan and 
Shelton, 2001). Both approaches are really uniquely developed using agent-based, 
and can indeed help understand the relation between behavior and institution.  
 
Many works, be it for computer scientists or economists,  were designed to fit the 
context of electricity market, which is very central since the problems can be 
extremely heavy for society (when there are huge unpredicted shortages) and the 
variations in price can be very fast. In the models that are created agents are not 
designed to represent human’s rationality, but to try to be as optimal as possible in 
the adaptation to the electricity market. Many institutions can be used, but 
auctions (which are theoretically supposed to be the most efficient of all market 
institutions) are widely used. Bidding behaviors, but also concentration of sellers 
and buyers and capacity to produce and sell (Nicolaisen at al., 2000) have an 
impact on the efficiency and this can be explored. As said before what is explored 
is the impact of the institution on efficiency and on market power. Two ways of 
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learning are used for the agents, and authors sometimes disagree on the way to 
choose: either social with a Genetic Algorithm, or individual with reinforcement 
learning, and it is already well know that this has a huge impact on global results 
(Vriend, 2000). We cannot here decide on the best choice to make. However, to 
our view, most results cannot really be extended to real life design since the 
representation of learning for agents can sometimes be badly adapted to the 
application context (necessity to have long learning in case of GA or even 
reinforcement learning).  
One original approach that is cited by March (2007) is the “evolutionary 
mechanism design” (Phelps et al. 2002), where strategy of three actors, sellers, 
buyers and auctioneers are all submitted to evolution and selection (the fitness of 
the auctioneer’s strategy being linked to the total profit of the participants). This 
approach is logically different since the institution itself (through the auctioneer) 
is what evolves to get to a better result, with the characteristic of the participants 
being fixed (relative number of each and relative production and demand).  
 
It is interesting to note that another branch deals with the representation of 
individual agents on large markets, and is also quite close to an idea of design of 
markets, but from the opposite perspective: by introducing agents in real markets. 
Computer scientists interesting in the analysis of cognition indeed have the goal of 
making artificial agents as efficient as possible in a context of bidding in auctions, 
at the same time from the point of view of the seller and the buyer (Greenwald 
and Kephard, 2002). They usually are not interested in the understanding of real 
humans’ behaviour and decisions, but rather in explaining the properties that can 
emerge in markets in which many artificial learning agents interact (with each 
other or humans), differentiating their strategies, getting heterogeneous payoffs 
and creating interesting price dynamics. The focus is very much put on 
information treatment. This very applied approach is interesting in so that many 
algorithms that are used for building programs can also be used for economic 
analysis in the framework of models of the type that have been explored here. 
However the aim is slightly different, since the indicator is in this latter case the 
individual success of a strategy, whereas the previous works on markets is based 
on global properties of the system.  
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6 Concluding remarks  
This chapter is not an extremely general view of market simulation in recent 
research, and instead of giving many examples, we focused on a few to show the 
diversity of questions, models, rationality and eventually results that can be found 
in the literature, coming from sometimes different backgrounds (classical 
economy, experimental economy, computer science). The representation of a 
market is always linked to the aim of the research, and there is never one way 
forward. The quantity and substitutability of goods, the possibility to interact with 
one or several sellers, with other buyers, the memory of the agents themselves, all 
depends on the type of issue, and this is why we have build the chapter in this 
manner: to give some ideas of the issues that have been addressed up until now 
with agent-based. What is noticeable is the real difference between this approach 
and the classical approach in economics, where the dynamics is not a central 
question. The achievements with the method are now numerous enough to prove 
that agent-based simulation can really participate in a better understanding of 
market institution, of behavior of individuals on market, and enhance the 
institutional choices of politics. What can be noted in conclusion is that several 
issues are still at stake when it comes to the representation of markets. 
 
First, like in most models, the temporal issue is huge. Most models use discrete 
time to organize the simulation. This is not so easy to understand the meaning of 
discrete time when it comes to an auction, where different agents can act precisely 
at the same time and have a different impact on prices than when they act 
sequentially. Some people are specifically working on this issue and build 
platforms that support a simulated continuous time4 (Daniel, 2006).  
 
Another technical issue is the one of learning sequences of actions. In a situation 
where agents evaluate their actions with profit, if they have to perform several 
actions in a row (i.e. choosing a seller and then accepting a price or not), it is 
impossible to decide which of these actions is the reason for a success or a failure. 
Facing this issue, economic papers describe agents that associate the profit to all 
                                                
4 Natlab, which can be found at: http://www.complexity-research.org/natlab 
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actions, as if they were separated. This is clearly not very satisfying in terms of 
logic, but no alternative modelling has been proposed yet.  
 
Eventually there is a conceptual gap in all the cited models. For the moment, 
another element has never been taken into account in the representation of agents’ 
reasoning on markets, which would fit in models where agents try to maximize 
their profit by choosing the best strategies. In this case, they can scan past actions 
and the following profits, or their past possible profit with all actions they could 
have undertaken and then select the best action in all contexts. This last vision is a 
bit more general than the first one, but in no case do the agents imagine that a 
change in their action will modify other agents’ behavior as well. This is strange 
enough, since a lot of people interested in game theory have been working on 
agents in market, but they have not produced models of anticipation about others’ 
choices. In markets where bargaining is central, it could however be a central 
feature in the understanding of real human behavior.  
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